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NOTES
PERMISSIBLE CLASSIFICATION BY RACE
Racial discrimination is dependent upon ability to distinguish by race.
Classification, being the legal equivalent of distinguishment, is -therefore at the
very heart of racial discrimination. It is hardly surprising then that when
courts are pursuing a policy of striking down racial discriminations, their
holdings will be interpreted to stand for -the invalidity of all state-drawn racial
classifications. Such a conclusion has been reinforced by the often imprecise
wording of the Supreme Court's opinions in this area. Little wonder then to
find legal writers saying: "Laws based on race are necessarily discriminatory,
and discriminatory legislation is unconstitutional per se."I Neither the assump-
tion nor the conclusion of that statement correctly reflects the Supreme Court's
decisions. For laws classifying by race are not necessarily discriminatory, nor
is all discriminatory legislation necessarily unconstitutional.
Confusion surrounding the issue of whether a state may undertake any
classification by race, and if so, under what circumstances, stems in large
measure from the Court's failure to discuss the distinction between racial and
other forms of classification. While the Court has consistently delimited racial
classifications by "some" more rigid test,2 it has sustained the power of the
state to classify generally with impunity under the fourteenth amendment so
long as the following test was met: The distinction drawn by the state must
(1) treat all similarly situated alike, (2) rest upon a real difference which bears
some reasonable relation to the objective of the legislation, and (3) be a part
of legislation the objective of which falls within a permissible state function. s
In addition, it is presupposed that a complainant, -to have standing before the
court, must allege that the classification drawn has a substantially injurious
effect on him, and is not merely a technical and unsubstantial discrimination. 4
In non-racial areas then, even though a plaintiff is able to show that a classifica-
tion discriminates against him,5 if it reasonably relates to -the purpose of the
state action involved the classification is upheld as not being violative of equal
protection-unless the purpose itself is in violation of due process. Thus, the
Court has taken the position that a classification that is discriminatory does not
necessarily violate the equal protection and due process requirements imposed
on the states by the fourteenth amendment.
Such has not appeared to be the Court's position in the area of classifica-
tions based on race. Here the Court has by and large limited its attention to
the issue of whether a racial classification is in fact discriminatory, and where
-BLAUTisn & FRGUsON, DFSEGREGATION A= TnE LAw 153 (2d ed. rev. 1962).
2 The nature and development of the test applied to racial classifications is con-
sidered in detail subsequently in this note.
8 Quaker Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 406 (1928).
4See Bank Comm'r v. Abilene Nat Bank, 179 Fed. 461, 465-66 (8th Cir. 1910),
aft'd, 228 U.S. 1 (1913).
5"It is the essence of a classification that upon the class are cast duties and
burdens different from those resting upon the general public." Atchison, T. & S.F.R.B.
v..Matthews, 174 U.S. 90, 106 (1899).
[4301
NOTES
it was found to be such, the classification was held invalid. Judicial inquiry did
not on the whole consider whether such a racially discriminatory classification
might nevertheless be valid as bearing a reasonable relationship to a valid state
function. 6
History of the Supreme Court's Position on Racial Classifications
The earliest cases under the fourteenth amendment interpreted it to mean
that a racial classification could not be used to place a burden on the minority
not equally placed on the majority; nor could it be used to grant a benefit to
-the majority not also accorded the minority.7 Only a racial classification that
did not violate -this benefit-burden principle could conceivably be upheld. It
was within this context that the case of Plessy v. Ferguson8 addressed itself to
the question of racial segregation. By finding that segregation did not in and of
itself violate the benefit-burden principle, the Court in Plessy upheld such
racial classifications as not being discriminatory. 9 Plessy then was concerned
only with an appropriate definition of "discrimination."' 0 Specifically, the case
stood for two propositions: (1) The minority's right must be equal to that of
all citizens," and (2) the separation of the minority from the majority in the
exercise of that right did not constitute a denial or diminution of the right. As
a result of this ruling dual lines of precedent evolved. Where -the racial classifica-
tion served merely to segregate, so long as separate facilities were provided
which in all points of comfort and convenience were equal to those made
available to the majority, the classification was upheld on the ground that it
was not discriminatory.' 2 But racial classifications that impaired the benefit
itself, such as the right to a fair trial by a representative jury,la the right to
vote' 4 and to hold public office,15 or the right to convey property,16 were held
invalid on the ground -that they were discriminatory.
Brown v. Board of EduC.17 addressed itself only to the first of these lines of
precedent-can separate ever be equal? Or, put another way, is a classification
6The succeeding section will develop the point in its historical context.
7 See, e.g., Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 317-18 (1879). Cf. Atchison, T. &
S.F.R.R. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96, 106 (1899).
s163 U.S. 537 (1896).
9 Separate but Equal, 1 R&cn RELs. L. Rn. 283 (1956).
10 In simplest terms, was segregation discrimination?
11 "ight" is used here rather than "benefit" to conform to the facts of the Plessy
case, but the principle is the same in either event. If the right or benefit was granted,
or the burden was imposed, on an unequal basis, then there was discrimination. This
shall serve as the functional definition of "discrimination" as used in this note.12 See Boyer v. Garret, 183 F.2d 582 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 912
(1950) (recreation); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (edu-
cation); McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R., 235 U.S. 151 (1914) (transportation).13 See Atkins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945) (dictum); Neal v. Delaware, 103
U.S. 370, 394 (1880).
14 See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
15 Cf. Garer v. Board of Pub. Works, 341- U.S. 716, 725 (1951) (dicta in con-
curring opinion).16 See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
17347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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that has the effect of segregating the races inevitably discriminatory? 8 In
Brown the Court answered -this question in the affirmative insofar as public
education was concerned. 19 That holding was later extended to apply to public
facilities generally.20 The effect of Brown then was to reverse the Plessy ruling
that segregation was not discrimination.
Nowhere in the Brown line of decisions did the Court ever imply that a
racially discriminatory classification might not be violative of the fourteenth
amendment if it were shown that it reasonably related to a valid state function.
However, three other Court decisions-two prior to Brown, and one at the
same time--made specific reference to the necessity for such additional judicial
inquiry. The cases of Hirabayashi v. United States2 ' and Korematsu v. United
States,22 dealing with extraordinary burdens imposed on residents of Japanese
ancestry during World War II, upheld the racially discriminatory classifications
there involved. Said Mr. Justice Black in the Korematsu opinion: "[AIll legal
restrictions which curtail -the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately
suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional....
Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restric-
tions." 23 And in Bolling v. Sharpe,24 the companion case to Brown, decided
under the fifth amendment because the fourteenth was not applicable to the
District of Columbia, Mr. Chief Justice Warren acknowledged that a right
could be restricted where such restriction served a proper governmental objec-
tive, but that segregation in public education is not reasonably related -to any
18 "Does segregation .. . solely on the basis of race, even though the physical
facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive .. . the minority group
of equal educational opportunities?" Id. at 493. (Emphasis added.) This wording
should be contrasted with the wording in DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW, supra note 1,
at 115: "The specific question before the Court was whether race per se is an invalid
classification when measured against the equal protection clause." The issue before
the Court in Brown and the cases following Brown was not a broad, nebulous "dis-
crirnination"--nor was it the entire question of classification. It was but one facet of
each of these categories-segregation. The importance of this distinction is that Brown
did not therefore encroach on the standard already being applied to cases not involving
segregation; nor did it, in one fell swoop, settle the entire classification question.
1) "Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." 347 U.S. at 495.
2 0 See Burton v. Wilminton Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (public
restaurant); State Athletic Conm'n v. Dorsey, 168 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. La. 1958),
aff'd mem., 359 U.S. 533 (1959) (athletic contests); Gayle v. Browder, 142 F. Supp.
707 (M.D. Ala. 1956), aS'd mem., 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (bus transportation); Holmes
v. City of Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955), remanded mem., 350 U.S. 879 (1955),
vacating, 124 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ga. 1954) (golf courses); Dawson v. Mayor & City
Council of Baltimore, 123 F. Supp. 193 (D. Md. 1954), rev'd per curiam, 220 F.2d 386
(4th Cir. 1955), aff'd mem., 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (bathing beaches); Muir v. Louisville
Park Theatrical Ass'n, 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953), affirming mere. sub nom.
Sweeney v. City of Louisville, 102 F. Supp. 525 (W.D. Ky. 1951), vacated and
remanded mere., 347 U.S. 971 (1954) (entertainment facilities).
21320 U.S. 81 (1943).
22 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
28 Id. at 216.
24347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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legitimate governmental objective.2 5 Thus the Court was essentially saying
that a racial classification that segregates is unconstitutional because it is
necessarily discriminatory, and because it cannot be reasonably related to any
valid governmental objective. The implication was clear that racial classifications
that do not segregate, and yet are otherwise discriminatory, may be constitu-
tionally upheld if they reasonably relate to a valid governmental function.
Unlike Brown, in these three cases the Court was adjudicating the issue of racial
classification within the framework of analysis applied to classification issues
generally.
26
The fact that racial classification cases subsequent to Brown and Bolling were
largely decided under the precedent of Brown resulted in widespread accept-
ance of the theory that once a racial classification is found to be discriminatory
it is necessarily unconstitutional. This, added -to the Court's pronouncements
that a racial classification is constitutionally suspect,27 led some to interpolate
still further and conclude that a racial classification is conclusively presumed to
be discriminatory, and therefore is unconstitutional per se.
28
It was not until its current term that the Court made a clear attempt to
reconcile its decisions in the area of racial classifications with its decisions as
to classifications generally. The case in point is McLaughlin v. Florida.29
The McLaughlin Test of Permissible Racial Classification
McLaughlin presented the Court with what is perhaps the most basic and
controversial issue underlying racial discrimination-the validity of state im-
posed racial classifications designed -to maintain purity of race. The anti-
miscegenation statutes here involved, which are in effect in nineteen states,30
prohibit intermarriage between white and Negro.31 Three of them, including
the Florida statute under attack, prohibit in addition interracial cohabitation,
25 Id. at 499-500.
26 See text accompanying note 3 supra.
2 7 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
28 See, e.g., BrLAusIEN & FERGUSON, DESEGREGATION AIN THE LAW, supra note 1;
St. Antoine, Color-Blindness but Not Myopia, 59 MicH. L. REv. 993, 994 (1961);
Wollett, Race Relations, 21 LA. L. REv. 85, 92 (1960); Notes and Comments, 38
Cm.-KEN L. REv. 169, 184 (1961).
29379 U.S. 184 (1964).
30 ALA. CONST. § 102; ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 360 (1958); ARK. STAT. § 55-104 (1947);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (1953); FLA. CoNsT. art. XVI, § 24; FLA. STAT. § 741.11
(1961); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-106 (1933); IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-104 (1952); Ky. REv.
STAT. § 402.020 (1943); LA. Cry. CODE art. 94 (Dart. 1945); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 398
(1957); Miss. CoNST. art. 14, § 263; Miss. CODE ANN. § 459 (1942); Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 451.020 (1959); N.C. CoNsT. art. XIV, § 8; N.C. Gm. STAT. § 51-3 (1953);
OK.A. STAT. tit. 43, § 12 (1961); S.C. CONsT. art. 3, § 34; S.C. CODE § 20-7 (1952);
TENN. CONST. art. (11), § 14; TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-402 (1956); TEx. REv. Civ.
STAT. art. 4607 (1948); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-54 (1953); W.V.. CODE ANN. § 4697
(1961); Wyo. STAT. § 20-18 (1957).
8i All the statutes apply to those of Negro, African or Mulatto descent; also cov-
ered in one or another statutes are Orientals, Mongolians, Malayans, and American and
Asiatic Indians. See Cummins & Kane, Miscegenation, the Constitution, and Science,
38 DicTA 24, 53-54 (1961).
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or provide a separate and more severe punishment for interracial illicit co-
habitation, adultery, and fornication.3 2 While these statutes have been constitu-
tionally challenged in the highest state courts a number of times,33 only Cali-
fornia invalidated its miscegenation law as being unconstitutional.3 4 The Supreme
Court, since upholding Alabama's interracial adultery and fornication statute
in 1882,35 has consistently shied away from considering the question3 6 until it
accepted -the McLaughlin case at its current term.
In this case a white Woman and Negro man were convicted under Florida's
interracial cohabitation statute.37 There is no precisely corresponding criminal
statute making a similar act of cohabitation a crime when the couple are
members of the same race.38 Thus the racial classification drawn makes an act
criminal which otherwise would not be. Florida based its position on the prece-
dent of Pace v. Alabama,0 an early case in which the Court upheld a statute
similar to -the one in issue in this case on the ground that it treats -the members
of both races alike and therefore the classification is not racially discriminatory.
In McLaughlin the Court rejected this argument, saying that mere equal appli-
cation to the class defined is not enough.40 In holding the Florida statute un-
constitutional, the Court at last discussed in detail the standard to be applied
in the adjudication of racial classification questions under -the fourteenth
amendment.
First the opinion.sets forth -the approach applied to classifications generally:
If a law deals alike with all of a certain class, and if the classification is based
3 2
AL.. CoDE tit. 14, § 360 (1958); ARK. STAT, § 41-806 (1947); FLA. STAT.
99 798.04, 798.05 (1961).
33 Green v. Alabama, 58 Ala. 190 (1877); State v. Pass, 59 Ariz. 16, 121 P.2d 882
(1942); Dodson v. State, 61 Ark. 57, 31 S.W. 977 (1895); Jackson v. City & County
of Denver, 109 Colo. 196, 124 P.2d 240 (1942); Scott v. Georgia, 39 Ga. 321 (1869);
State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389 (1871); Miller v. Lucks, 203 Miss. 824, 36 So. 2d 140
(1948); State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175 (1883); State v. Kennedy, 76 N.C. 232 (1877);
Eggers v. Olson, 104 Okla. 297, 231 P. 483 (1924); Loams v. State, 50 Tenn. 247
(1871); Naim v. Nain, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955).
8
4 Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
85 Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1882).
36 Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749, remanded 350 U.S. 891 (1955)
(record incomplete as to domicile of parties), aff'd, 197 Va. 734, 90 S.E.2d 849 (Sup.
Ct. of App. refused to comply with mandate to return to trial court), motion for
recall of mandate denied, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (want of fed. question); Jackson v.
State, 37 Ala. App. 519, 72 So. 2d 114, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 888 (1954); In re
Monk's Estate, 48 Cal. App. 2d 603, 120 P.2d 167 (Dist. Ct. 1941), appeal dismissed,
317 U.S. 590 (1942) (not ified within allowable time).
3
7 "Any Negro man and white woman, or any white man and Negro woman, who
are not married to each other, who shall habitually live in and occupy in the night-time
the same room, shall be punished by imprisonment not exceeding twelve months, or by
fine not exceeding five hundred dollars." FLA. STAT. § 798.05 (1961).
38 But see FLA. STAT. § 798.03 (1961), the general fornication statute, which
provides for three months imprisonment and $30 fine, and FLA. STAT. § 798.04 (1961),
the comparable interracial fornication statute, which provides for twelve months im-
prisonment and $1,000 fine.
89 106 U.S. 583 (1882).
40379 U.S. 184, 190-91 (1964).
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upon a real difference which bears a reasonable and just relation to -the purpose
of the legislation, then the law, though it may be discriminatory in effect, is
not obnoxious to the equal protection clause; and further, if the legislative
purpose falls within a valid governmental function, the law is not violative of
due process.4 1 Using this as a starting point, the Court then proceeds to dis-
tinguish its approach when the classification is based on race. It points out
that while normally legislatures are allowed a wide discretion in drawing
classifications, 42 such an approach cannot be applied to classifications based
on race; for the central purpose of the fourteenth amendment was to eliminate
racial discriminations arising out of state-drawn classifications, and therefore any
such classification is "constitutionally suspect,"43 i.e., is presumed to bear no
reasonable relation to any constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose. The
opinion goes on to state that racial classifications embodied in criminal statutes,
as in this case, will be subjected -to particularly rigid scrutiny-there must be
some overriding statutory purpose requiring the racial classification to be
drawn.44
In evaluating the racial classification in this case, the Court determines that
the objectives of the statute may be the enforcement of "basic concepts of
sexual decency" or the enforcement of Florida's law prohibiting intermarriage
between the races. The court accepts the first as a legitimate purpose, and, for
the sake of argument, assumes the second constitutional without expressing
an opinion on the point. It then asks whether the racial classification drawn
is necessary and essential to the accomplishment of either of these purposes.
It concludes that it is not because the general and nonracial illicit cohabitation
statute serves those purposes equally as well.
4 5
Unfortunately the opinion is not precise in one particular. The Court con-
sidered in detail if and under what circumstances a discriminatory racial
classification might be upheld under the fourteenth amendment, for the Florida
statute in issue was clearly discriminatory in effect on its face. The Court took
no notice, however, of the possibility that a racial classification need not inevitably
be discriminatory. Based on the facts before it, it was natural for the Court to
ignore the problem of a cause and effect relationship between classification and
discrimination, and to speak only to the issue of proper constitutional justifica-
tion for -the discrimination.
In the past the Court has said that, as to racial classifications, once the
plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of
justifying the classification falls forthwith upon the state.46 And, as to classifica-
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Id. at 192.
44 Ibid. But see the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart, joined in by Mr.
Justice Douglas, at 198: ". . . [Tihe Court implies that a criminal law of the kind
here involved might be constitutionally valid if a State could show 'some overriding
statutory purpose.' This is an implication in which I cannot join, because I cannot
conceive of a valid legislative purpose . . . for a state law which makes the color
of a man's skin the test of whether his conduct is a criminal offense . . . . Discrim-
ination of that kind is invidious per se."
45 Id. at 193-96.
46Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 563 (1953).
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tions generally, a discrimination which is merely technical, and in no sense
substantial, does not render a statute void.47 Within this context, then, is it
enough for the plaintiff to allege that the state has used the designation
"Negro," or must he point to discriminatory effects threatened by the designa-
tion before a court will proceed with the test set forth in McLaughlin?48 The
McLaughlin opinion gives no precise answer.49 But prior opinions of the
Court clearly seem to say that mere designation is not enough.5° True-courts
will be inclined to presume discriminatory effects where they find a racial desig-
nation; 51 but, where not dictated by precedent, such presumption is not con-
clusive and is subject to being overcome by the state.52 Certainly it can be
argued that the entire line of precedent under Plessy and Brown make sense
only if racial discrimination, and not merely racial designation, must be alleged.
Thus, although there is this impreciseness in the opinion, McLaughlin would
seem to settle the question of what test the Court is applying to racial classifica-
tions. It is applying the same test that is applied to other classification questions
under the fourteenth amendment-with the qualifications that there is a pre-
sumption of invalidity rather -than validity of the statute,53 and that the state
has the burden of establishing a necessary rather than a merely reasonable
relation to a valid governmental objective.54 Specifically, under this test, the
courts will analyze a racial classification issue in three steps: (1) Is there a
prima facie showing that the classification is discriminatory? If no, then the
classification is upheld; if yes, then (2) has the state sustained its burden of
showing that the classification is necessary to achieve the statutory objective?
If no, the classification is invalid; if yes, then (3) has the state sustained its
47 Bank Comm'r v. Abilene Natl Bank, 179 Fed. 461, 465-66 (8th Cir. 1910),
aff'd, 228 U.S. 1 (1913).48 There is clear authority for the proposition that the plaintiff need not point
to an actual discriminatory result-a threatened discriminatory effect being enough.
See, e.g., Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964).
49 Though in its language the opinion does state the issue in terms of whether the
discrimination is an ... arbitrary or invidious discrimination .. ." 379 U.S. 184,
191 (194).50 "In the abstract, Louisiana imposes no restriction upon anyone's candidacy nor
upon an elector's choice in the casting of his ballot. But by ... [requiring that the
ballot designate the race of all candidates] . . . the State fumishes a vehicle by
which racial prejudice may be ...aroused . . . .The vice lies ... in the placing
of the power of the State behind a racial classification that induces racial prejudice
at the polls." Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964); "Even if the white and
yellow tickets . . . [designating race] . . . were . . . [selected] ...without dis-
crimination, opportunity was available to resort to it . . . and where not a single
Negro [juror] was selected . . . we think petitioner established a prima facie case
of discrimination." Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953). In each of these
cases the Court took pains to look beyond the racial designation for an actual or
threatened discriminatory effect.
51 See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); Korematsu v. United States;
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
52 See Balaban v. Rubin, 14 N.Y.2d 193, 199 N.E.2d 375, 250 N.Y.S.2d 281,
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 881 (1964).
53 See text accompanying note 51 supra.
54379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
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burden of showing that the legislative objective falls within a constitutionally
valid state function. If yes, the classification is valid; if no, it is invalid.55
The McLaughlin Test Applied
To demonstrate the McLaughlin test, it is useful to apply it to a variety of
current racial classification issues faced by the Supreme Court prior to the Mc-
Laughlin opinion.
In Hamm v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections5 6 several Negro and white citizens
of Virginia brought action to have certain of the State's constitutional and
statutory provisions declared unconstitutional. The provisions challenged were
in -three categories: (1) voting record laws,57 (2) property ownership and taxa-
tion statutes,58 and (3) a statute relative to divorce decrees.5 9 The laws of the
first two categories required that state officials keep racially separate records,
and the statute of the third category required designation of the parties' race in
every divorce decree. A three-judge Federal District Court struck down the
requirement for separate records, and upheld the divorce statute. In so doing
the court reasoned that: "The infirmity of the provisions [struck down] ... lies
in their mandate of separation6O of names by race."68 The court went on to
point out that the classification serves no legitimate governmental purpose-
"[they] serve no other purpose than to classify and distinguish official records
on the basis of race or color."62 As to the divorce statute, the court reasoned
that designation of race serves a useful purpose, and that the procurement
and classification of vital statistics is a legitimate state function.6 The Supreme
Court affirmed the lower court's ruling in each instance without opinion, and
without hearing.
64
Were the McLaughlin test to be applied to this case, its application to the
first two categories of statutes might well differ from its application to the third.
Thus, as to the voting& property, and taxation statutes, it would be held that
(1) by showing the requirement of segregation, the plaintiffs made a prima facie
55 This order of analysis is the most logical in most fact situations. It is also in
line with the Court's traditional preference for reviewing legislative enactments under
the narrower grounds of equal protection, rather than questioning the legislature's
exercise of its discretionary authority under due process. However, steps (2) and (3)
can be interchanged where the facts or surrounding circumstances of a case so dictate.
56 Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19, affirming per curiam, Hamm v. Virginia State Bd.
of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Va. 1964).
5 7 VA. Co NsT. art. II, § 38; VA. CO of 1950, §§ 24-28, 24-120 as amended 1963.
The appropriate excerpts are set forth in note I of 230 F. Supp. 156, 157 (E.D. Va.
1964).
5 8 VA. CoDE or 1950, §§ 58-790, 58-802 (para. b-dh), 58-880. The appropriate
excerpts are set forth in note 2 of 230 F. Supp. 156, 157 (E.D. Va. 1964).
59 VA. CoDE: of 1950 § 20-101. The appropriate excerpt is set forth in note 3 of
230 F. Supp. 156, 157 (E.D. Va. 1964).
60 Emphasis the court's.
61230 F. Supp. 156, 158 (E.D. Va. 1964).
621bid.
63 Ibid.
64 379 U.S. 19 (1964).
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showing of a discriminatory racial classification, 65 (2) segregation of records
based on race is not necessary -to -the legislative objective of collecting and main-
taining vital statistics.68 Thus, even though (3) the legislative objective of
collecting and maintaining vital statistics is a permissible state function, the
racial classification involved is invalid. As to the divorce statute, there are two
bases upon which the court might have validated the statute. It might be held
that the mere showing of a racial designation does not establish a prima facie
case of discrimination, and hence plaintiff has no standing before the Court.6
Or, more probably: (1) the Court is willing to presume a prima facie showing
of discrimination by the showing of the racial classification in official state
records, 68 but (2) designation by race is necessary to the collection and main-
tenance of vital statistics, and (3) the collection and maintenance of vital sta-
tistics is a permissible state function. Hence, the racial classification, even though
presumed discriminatory, is found to be valid.
The Hamm case is an interesting example of the McLaughlin test if for no
other reason than that it scrutinizes segregation carried to what must be its most
extreme boundary-separation not of people, but of their statistical facsimiles.
Perhaps a more significant application of the test relates to the question of
whether a state may classify according to race in order to attempt to alleviate
problems which have developed as a result of past discriminations and segrega-
tion. Again, the current term of the Court has presented an instructive decision.
In Balaban v. Rubin69 the Court refused to review a New York Court of Appeals
decision allowing a school board to classify according to race in order to remedy
de facto segregation. The Court of Appeals of New York upheld the racial classi-
fication drawn on the basis that it was not discriminatory in effect, saying: "The
simple fact as to the plan adopted.., is that it excludes no one from any school
and has no tendency to foster or produce racial segregation." 7°
Under the McLaughlin test it is obvious that here the classification was upheld
under the first step of analysis, and there was no occasion to go further. That is,
the plaintiffs did not make out a prima facie case that the classification was dis-
criminatory in effect.
Another case of interest in illustrating the utility and applicability of the
McLaughlin test is Anderson v. Martin.71 Here the statute put to constitutional
scrutiny provided for -the designation of the race of all candidates on the ballot.
65 The Brown line of cases had established that segregation was discrimination.
Here the court applied this principle, though the racial segregation was limited to
official records. Inasmuch as there would not appear to be any actual, present dis-
crimination implicit in such a purely clerical segregation, the court was taking judicial
notice of threatened discriminatory effects. See note 48 supra.
66 Which is in line with the Court's prior edict that segregation is not reasonably
related to any proper governmental objective. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500
(1954).
67 This avenue remains open to the courts. See, e.g., Balaban v. Rubin, 14 N.Y.2d
193, 199 N.E.2d 375, 250 N.Y.S.2d 281, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 881 (1964).
6 8 See text accompanying note 51 supra.
69 14 N.Y.2d 193, 199 N.E.2d 375, 250 N.Y.S.2d 281, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 881
(1964).
70 14 N.Y.2d 193, supra note 69, at 199.
71375 U.S. 399 (1964).
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A District Court held that since the race of all candidates had to be noted, there
was no discrimination, and so sustained the statute. 72 On direct appeal the
Supreme Court reversed. In its opinion the Supreme Court explained that while
"in the abstract . . . [the statute] . . . imposes no restriction upon anyone's
candidacy . . ." yet the designation "placed the power of the State behind
a racial classification that induces racial prejudice at the polls." 73 And, said the
Court, there is no relevance in the state pointing up the race of the candidate as
bearing upon the state's legitimate function of informing the electorate as to
the candidates' qualifications for office. 74
Again, under the McLaughlin test the logic would be: (1) there is a prima
facie showing that the classification threatens a discriminatory effect, and (2)
there is no necessary relationship between the classification and the objective
of the legislation. Thus, even though (3) informing the electorate as to the
candidates' qualifications for office is a permissible state function, the classifica-
tion is invalid.
Conclusion
As noted at the beginning of this article, discrimination is in large measure
dependent upon classification. It by no means follows, however, that every
classification invariably leads to discrimination. Nor does it follow that even a
racially discriminatory classification may not under extraordinary circumstances
be upheld as necessary to some overriding general welfare objective. To apply
any such pat standard as that represented by the slogan "the Constitution is
color blind"75 is to close the eyes of the state to situations in which it must take
cognizance of color in order to act effectively. There can, for example, be no
ameliorative action with regard to de facto segregation, or to discrimination
itself, if the state cannot recognize racial distinctions.76 Even the Civil Rights
Commission must survey individuals according to race in order to have accurate
data on which to set policy.77 The relevance of race in adoption proceedings is
self-evident.78 In another vein, it might be quite reasonable to select diplomatic
personnel for some of the African nations with a view to race as well as qualifica-
tions. In short, the best interests of the state and of the individual members of
the minority and the majority cannot be effectively protected through an inflexible
position holding all racial classifications invalid per se. Rather, these questions
72 206 F. Supp. 700 (D.C. La. 1962).
73 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964).
74 Id. at 403.
75 "Our Constitution is color-blind...." Mr. Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion
in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896).76 "Whether the Fourteenth Amendment should be read to outlaw race or color
as determinants of all official action must be tested not alone by the effect of such a
principle on state-required segregation but also by its impact upon measures that
take race into account to equalize job opportunity or to reduce de facto segrega-
tion .... " Wechsler, Introduction to PniNcrPI.~s, Poramcs A N Fu1rA E.rrAL LAw
at xiv (1961).
77 See Storey, The Report of the Commission on Civil Rights, 46 A.B.A.J. 39, 41
(1960) (author was co-chairman of Comm'n).
7 8 In re Adoption of a Minor, 228 F.2d 446, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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